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In an article published in 1968, Professor Jon dell correctly
lated, ·'the future growth of the economy will depend considerably
on the efficiency and effectiven ss of marketing programs." 1 He
pointed out the need for res~arch to measure and ex~lain the rela tive importance of the maJor elements of marketing strategy,
which he identified a : product effort, sales effort, distribution, and
pricing strategy. dell was particularly interested in establishing
the importance of non price competitive strategy . He emphasized
that the traditional economists who attempted to explain all market
behavior in terms of price competition were incorrect in their as sumption .
Udell's major findings, here summarized, strongly support his
emphasis on nonprice competition:

1. All major facets of competitive strategy are essential to the
marketing program.
2. onprice facets are more important than price facets.
3. Marketing strategies vary considerably among industries.
4. The most important general facet of strategy is sales effort.
5. Sales management and personal selling are the most important types of sales effort used.
Professor dell's study, probably done in 1967 though results
were_ published in 1968, was a mil stone at that time-a period of
relative plenty characterized by high productivity, adequate resources, mild inflation, high mployment, and a sound wage structure. But times change. The years 1974 and 1975 can best be descr1b~d as a time of relative scarcity. with resources in short supply, Jobs hard to find, prices high, credit tight, and real wages
Thus, it was decided to replicate Udell's study to test its
\'ahdtty under changed times and circumstances. His three hypotheses, along with a fourth added by the authors to account for
time differences, were investigated:

fall!nr

1. The nonprice facets of competitive strategy are. from the
manufactu rer's point of view, at least as important as pricing.
*Cont. No. 10, ollege of Business Admini tration, Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station, Manhattan 66506.

2. The importance of the facets of competitive strategy will vary
with time and economic conditions.
3. The consume_rs' kn~wledge concerning the product, the effort
~hey expend m making pu_rchases, and the nature of their buy~n_g motives should be maJor determinants of nonprice compet1t1ve strategy.
4. The importance of the facets of competiti~e strategy will vary
according to the nature of the products market (industry
type). 2

If UdeU's conclusions are to be useful pragmatic tools, they must
stand up to the test of time.

RE EARCH \iETHODOLOGY

I

I

The relatively simple research methodology of this study basically was that used by Udell. A questionnaire was ent to 222 marketing vice president selected randomly from Fortune's top 500
manufacturing firms. Including a firm on the list meant that it had
successful products as measured by sales volume. The sample list
was prepared during December 1974 and January 1975. A 36 percent return was obtained, resulting in 80 usable questionnaires-49
from industrial-product manufacturers and 31 from consumerproduct manufacturers.
The marketing vice presidents were asked to estimate the relative contribution made by each of the major elements of marketing
strategy to the marketing effort of their successful products. The
meas ure of contribution was determined by allocating a total of 100
points among these four marketing strategy elements (consistent
with Udell's identification):
Product Effort. Includes product planning, product R &
D. product testing, services accompanying the product,
and other.
Sales Effort. Includes sales management and personal
selling, advertising, and other promotional programs.
Distribution. Includes the selection, development, and
ev~luation of distribution channels, transportation and inventory control, and other .
Pricing Strategy. Includes price determination , pricing
policies, and pricing strategies.

Furthermore, product effort. sales effort, distribution, and pricing
strategy were divided into these specific activities:
Product Effort. Pre-sales service, past-sales service, tech·
nical R & D, market research, style R & D, and other.
2

Sales Effort. Includes sales management and personal
selling, broadcast media, printed media, special promotional activities, branding and promotional packaging, and
other.
Distribution. Transportation, warehousing and inventory,
determination of channels, selection and installation of
channels, assistance to and development of channels, and
other.
Pricing Strategy. Price policies, pricing strategies, and
price determination .

Each el~ent had six facets. except that pricing strategy had
three. i,espondents were asked to rank the importance of each
activity to the total of the element, based on 100 points. Thus, it
was possible to compare the major elements of strategy to each
other and to compare the activities, or facets, associated within
each element. (There was no reason to believe that the respondents
did not understand what was required of them.} Results were tab ulated according to industrial - and consumer-goods manufacturers.
It is difficult to duplicate exactly another person's work; and in
the Udell study, duplication was made difficult because not all aspects of the research were identified. Although this study represented Udell's fairly well, three differences are worth mentioning:
1. Udell based his analysis on 485 respondents asked to select

one successful product for analysis. In this study executives
were simply asked specific questions about their company's
successful products, without specifying any particular one.
2. Udell divided consumer-product manufacturers into consumer-durable and consumer-nondurable firms. No division was
made in this study; so, for comparison purposes, it was neces sary to average Udell's two classes of consumer firms.
3. Udell did not compare the activities of pricing strategy, included in this study.
These differences are presented to aid the reader in evaluating
the results, but it is not thought that they materially affect the
conclusions.
ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY IN
1968 AND 1975 COMPARED
Th_e 197_5 study provided mixed support for Udell's findings on
relat1onsh1ps among the major elements of strategy. Udell's finding
that sales effort was the most important type of competitive strategy was not supported by the 1975 study, which did, however,
support Udell's findings that: (l} all elements of strategy are important, and (2) non price competitive strategy is perceived as more im3

portant than price strategy for successful products. Thus, overall
the 1975 data supported the first hypothesis in this study. Each of
the findings is discussed here in detail.
AU Strategy Elements contribute To PrQduct Success

Information shown in Table 1 supports Udell's finding that all elements of competitive strategy are important to successful products. Although there were positional changes in importance, no element, including pricing, could be called unimportant. In fact, respondents did not allocate the smallest percentage of total effort to
pricing in either 1968 or 1975. Each year distribution was perceived
by respondents as the least important element of strategy ; pricing,
second least important. No one, however, can doubt the importance
of distribution's gain, as seen by producers. between 1968 and 1975:
a 3.1 percentage point rise (from 12.2 percent to 15.3 percent). Only
product effort had a greater percentage point increase over the
period . Historically, business has tended to downgrade distribution-associated problems, but the evidence shows the situation is
slowly changing.
Table I

I It

Perceived Importance of the Major Elements
of Marketing Strategy

•t

.

t

1975
Study
Percent

UdeU's 1968
Study
Percent •

1. Product effort

40.6

27.8

2. Distribution

15.3

12.2

3. Total product
and distribution

55.9

40.0

4. Sales effort

26.2

41.l

5. Pricing strategy

17.9

18.4

100.0

99.5

Elements
of
Strategy

L. •
it•! •I

,i.1

·~i"'

lill

,jl

~Vi
t:1 '1
11\,11111

1·11

TOTAL

• Udell's figures do not add to 100 percent because he included a
category for "other" not included in this study.
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Product and Sales Effort Reverse Positions

It can be observed from Table 1 that in 1968 respondents, by allocating 41.1 percent to it, considered sal~s eff?r.t the most im~ortant ty pe of competitive s~rategy. By adding pricing _(a commun!ca tions device that directly influences purchase much like 1;n:omot1on)
to sales effort, approximately 60 percent of total compet1t1ve strategy was allocated to sales-related activity in 1968.
Those findings were reasonable for 1968, a time of economic
growth, when consumers were generally optimistic about the
future and producers' major problem was how to induce customers
to purchase more of the fir~·s abunda~t products and serv_ic~s.
Furthermore, it is sound business practice to expand advert1smg
and personal selling when customers are already in a frame of mind
to purchase. for then a dollar spent on sales effort has a more than
proportional return. Thus. in 1968 it was good business to allocate
more effort to sales.
The fact that, relatively speaking, sales effort was so important
to competitive strategy in 1968 led Udell to conclude, "business
evidently considers the creation of markets more important than
the creation of products ." 3 Though certainly true for the time, the
tone of Udell's discussion implied that he considered that state to be
normal for all points in time . One cannot agree with his statement.
"it is through the implementation of an invention that progress and
profits are achieved. " 4 The more successful management is the one
that can best adapt its strategy to changing times and economic
conditions. Implementing all elements of competitive strategy,
related in proper proportions . to market conditions fosters
economic progress and business profits . Udell had no opportunity
to test over time whether manufacturers consistently allocate more
effort to sales than to product.
The data in Table 1 support the hypothesis of this study: that
allocating sales and product effort changes with time and economic
conditions. By 1975 respondents had almost completely reversed
how they perceived product and sales effort in relation to successful
products; they perceived product effort. with 40.6 percent of the
to_tal , as most important. Just as pricing can be directly associated
with sales, so distribution can be associated with product strategy.
By combining distribution with product effort, nearly 60 percent of
all 1975 competitive strategy was devoted to making. servicing,
and distributing the product.
The results are consistent with market-related conditions
existing in 1975. First, the economy was in a serious recession, with
unemployment highest since World War II, inflation at an unprec edented high, and consum ers genera!Jy pessimistic toward the market . Sales effort, especially advertising, is typically reduced during
5

·such a ~eriod, because t~e returns per dollar spent are less than
propo~t1onal. Th~s, even 1f product expenditures had remained the
same m 1975 as rn 1968, less sales emphasis would have caused a
relative increase in the perceived importance of product effort.
Secon?, it wa~ re~sonable to give increased attention to the
product m 1975, m view of shortages of such strategic raw material~ as oil, natural gas, plast_ics, paper, a~d lumber. Management
lyp1cally devotes more attention to the pohcy area causing trouble.
That product-related problems were on the increase in 1975 alone
could explain much of the shift to product effort as a proportion of
total competitive strategy.

I

, ,I

Third, the consumer movement created product pressures in
1975. In its infancy in 1968, consumerism had become a real market
force by the early 1970's. Consumer groups were increasing in
number and becoming more vocal, and their pressures were making industry and government "product conscious." As Federal
Trade Commission tightened product-related restrictions, significant laws, such as The Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Consumer
Product Safety Act, were passed. It was only natural that management shifted strategy to meet the new pressure.
~onprice Elements of Strategy More Important
The data in Table 1 clearly support Udell's contention that nonprice elements of competitive strategy are more important than
price in establishing successful products. With nonprice element_s
perceived to account for approximately 82 percent of total com~et1·
tive strategy in both 1968 and 1975, only about 18 percent remam~d
for pricing strategy. Udell suggested that pricing fared so poorly ~n
practice although perceived as so important by economists for sLX
environmental and economic reasons:
1. Consumers in wealthier nations are less concerned about
price.
.
2. Product complexity may place more pressure on commun1cations than on pricing.
.
3. The intricacy of our economic system places greater emphasis
on mass marketing communications.
.
.
4. The inherent ologopolistic nature of American industry takes
the pressure off price strategy.
5. Product differentation provides price independence.
6. Economic development of a nation (creating markets) places
emphasis on non price strategy. s

The environmental and economic conditions, which appeared_ as
logical in 1975 as they did in 1968, present a reasonable explanation
for the relationships found. Though one may question the relevance
of items No. 1, No. 2, and No. 6 (based on the evidenc~ already
sented in this study), one cannot dispute that, even m 1975, wh

pr:~
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oduct effort was perceived more important than sales effort,
p:les effort ranked above pricing in perceived importance. Thus, all
environmental and economic reasons advanced were probably
working to some degree .

!ix

Udell, concerned about the ability of management to properly assess the impor tance of pricing, stated, "h?wever, another e~~lan!•
tion for the relatively small number of points allocated to pncmg 1s
that management may have underestimated the importance of pricing."6 He felt t hat manag~ment might have rated ~ricing low simplv because it takes less t ime to perform that function than others .
The 1975 data support Udell's low allocation for pricing . The fact
that respondents dramatically changed their perception of the importance of the elements of strategy shows t~at th~y appre~iated
what is significant. The fact that there was so little difference m the
perceived importance of pricing, only 0.5 percentage points hetween 1968 and 1975, suggests that the respondents recognized its
proper placement. Management was certainly consistent in its assessment of the importance of pricing to overall competitive strat
egy.
STRATEGIES BY INDUSTRIES AND CUSTOMERS
FOR 1968 AND 1975 COMPARED
Udell provided data to support his hypothesis that allocating the
elements of competitive strategy to successful products varies by
type of industry and by buyer motives. The 1975 figures further
support the first part of the assumption but not the latter part.
First, data in Table 2 support Udell's finding (in 1968} that thP
perceived allocation of the elements of strategy to successful products varies by industry. Product effort had become the most important element of strategy by 1975 for both industrial - and consumergoods produce rs. However, there were important differences in
both 1968 and 1975 in the allocation of strategy by industry type .
The increase in the element of distribution, reported earlier in this
study, was entirely due to an increase in perceived importance
among industrial-goods firms. Consumer-goods manufacturers had
?:creased their allocation of distribution as a proportion of compet1t1ve strategy between 1968 and 1975. Also, whereas consumer ~oods '"?anufacturers depended less on price in 1975 than in 1968,
tndustr1al-goods producers did not. The overall allocation of product-related effort (product effort and distribution) was very similar
for the two major industry types each year (about 56 per cent of
total st_rategy in 1975 for both types of producers, compared with
approximately 41 percent in 1968) .
. Secon_d. Udell's hypothesis number 3 (on the relationship of buying motives and the allocation of str ategy elements) was not sup-

-
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ported by the 1975 figures . His hypothesis can be paraphrased
thus:
Sales effort should vary with the trength of buying motives a nd inve rsely with purchas ing effort and knowledge,
while product effor t should vary directly with the
stre ngth of operational buying motives, purchasing effort,
and buyer knowledge_
In a separate analysis, Udell discovered that "i ndustrial buyers
tended to have predominately operational buying motives, more intensive buying effor t. and more knowledge concerning products
than the purchaser of consumer goods ." 7 T hat information was obtained using the semantic diffe re ntial (data not repor ted in t he article)_ dell felt that industrial firms, wh ose buyers had more and
better product information , would use relatively more product
effort in the mix than would consumer -product firms, who would
rel y on sales effort becau ·e their cust ome r s could not judge the
truth of the communications.
Table2

·r

P erceived Importance of the Elements of
Compe titive trateg y in Variou s lndu tries

, I

i11

Producers of

•I

Elements of
trateg y

L• I

r''
,,i41

1

"-~11
1.-.' I'
JJ 1,11

~it1. i,1

Consumer Goods
Industrial Good
dell's 1968 1975 Udell's 1968
1975
Study
tudy
tud y
tudy
Percent Percent Percent Perceat b

1. Product effort

39.8

29.6

41.9

2. Distribution

16.0

10.1

14.3

23.5
17.5

3. Total product
and distribution

55.8

39.7

56_2

41.0

4. Sales effort
5. Pricing strategy

24.6

40.9

28 .4

41.l

19 .6

19.0

15.4

17.5

TOTAL

100.0

99_6•

100.0

99_6

• Udell 's figu res do not add lo 100 percent because he included a
category for "other" not included in this study.
b Average

8

of consumer durables and nondurables.

--

The 1968 figu re relative to his hypothesis are not so clear cut as
Udell would have one believe (T able 2). Udell supported his posi tion by pointing oul that trial firms allocated 29 .6 percent of total
strategy to product effort in 1968. while producers of con umer
goods allocated only 23.5 per<' nt- 6.1 p~rcenta_g e -~oint dif.ference
favoring industrial product sell_e rs. Bu~ industrial firms, with 40.9
percent, and consumer-goods firms. with 41.1 percent. had only a
very small (0.2) percentage-point difference. Udell made the differ ence appear significant hy combining distribution , which he felt is
mostly ale effort. with sales . x The combined totals showed 51.0
percent for inou trial producers and 58.6 percent for consumergoods producers .
However logical as umptions appear, the 1975 data provide a different picture : consumer-goods manufacturers allocating more
effort to product strategy (4 1.9 p rcent l than industrial producers
did !39.8 percent) and also more to sales effort (28.6 percent) than
industrial-goods firms did (2 4.6 percent !. The pattern was not conistent with the near -comparable 1968 figures reported by Udell.
Adding distribution to sales effort for 1975, (40.6 percent for industrial producers and 42.7 percent for consumer-goods produc •
ersl. as Udell for 1968, would reduce the difference to 2.1 percentage points, which hardly encourages the type of conclusion drawn
by Udell. The more reasonable position is that the data are not sufficiently definitive Lo det rmine the relationship of sales effort and
product effort to market activities .

FACET OF EA H ELEMENT OF STRATEGY COMPARED
There is more to the story than comparing perceived importance
of lhe major elements of competitive strategy to successful prod ucts . There can be important variation s in the specific facets of each
strateg:y element. The considerable number and degree or variation~ d1sco~ered in perceived importanc of the elements suggest
possible adJustments in the facets o[ each dement. In this section
the hypothesis tested for product effort, distribution, sales effort.
and pr!cing strategy is: the facets of each element of trategy vary
according to time and economic conditions .
Produ ct trategies om pared By Years

Product effort was divided into six facets to determine the effect

?f changing economic condition· on the allocation . Data presented

in _Ta~le 3 indicate that in the allocation of product facets for industrial firms and for consumer-goods producers was similar in 196
and 1975. There were difference • but one must conclude that in
these year~ the relative importance of product facets changed much
less than did the overall change in product effort. P rha ps certain
types of product activities, such as R & D and mar ket research. are
9

necessary no matter what the economic situation, and perhaps
business may not have much latitude to change those activities
However. despite the similarities, there is support for the hypothe:
sis of change over time.
The largest percentage-point change_ for indust'.ial-goods producers between 1968 and 1975 resulted as effort shifted from presales service to the "other" category. In the con umer-goods field
the shift was from technical R & D to the "other" category. In'.
crease in the "other" category, significant and consistent for every
element of strategy, could reflect an inability of the respondents to
show a decrease in all types of expenditures on product effort
during the period of recession and shortage. "Other" was not defined on the questionnaire, so it could have been interpreted as "not
allocated."
Table 3
Relative Importance of the Facets of Product Effort
Producer's of
•t

I

',11

I

Facet

.I
;- . ,i
I

....._ I

u,

• • I

.~•i,,
""ll 11

:l·•,·i
~•··
r,•'1·
t,111

Consumer Goods
Industrial Goods
1975 "deU's 1968 1975 deU's 1968 1975
Study• Average
tudy
Study
tudy
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent

1. Pre-sales
service

15.7

23.7

11.6

12.5

13.9

2. Post -sales
service

18.0

17.7

14.9

11.7

16.6

3. Technical
R&D

32.5

34.5

25.7

36.6

29.3

4. Market
research

15.1

15.7

18.0

22.7

16.l

5. Style
R&D

8.1

6.1

16.3

14.2

11.5

6. Other

10.6

2.3

13.5

2.5

12.6

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

TOTAL

•Average of cons um er durables and nondurables.
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Industrial -goods producers in 1975 consistently assigned more effort to service and technical R & D than did producers of rons~mer
goods. Whereas industrial firms allocated 33 .7 per<'ent of their effort to pre-sales service and post -sales service, consumer-goods
produc r allocated only 26.5 percent of effort to those two facets.
On the other hand. in 1975 consumer-goods producers perceived
market research and style R & D as being more important when
marketing uccessful products than did industrial producers. Thus,
although there was considerable similarity for each type of producer over time, there were important variations between producer type · each year.

It was thought that the recession would result in a shift from a
service orientation to a research orientation, in that service is ex pen ive and may stand cutbacks, while re earch can also produce
savings as a result of better products or increased efficiency.
However. the 1968 and 1975 figures do not support that assumption . Although pre -sales service declined for both producer types,
post-sales service increased for each. Furthermore, technical R &
D, the most important facet of product effort, declined between
1968 and 1975 for both producer types. That finding adds to the suspicion that the "other" category was used to show the tendency to
cut cosl.

Di tribution Compared By Years
The six facets of distribution (Table 4) supported the hypothesis
that distribution changes with time and circumstances. There was
less similarity in distribution data between years for ind ustrial- and
consumer-goods producers than wa found for product effort. Indu trial-goods producers perceived warchou ing and inventory as
the mo t important fa<'et in both 1968 and 1975, but, whereas they
considered transportation serond most important in 1968, in 1975
they placed determination of channel in second place-a shift that
~ggested ~n economy move by management and one consistent
w1Lh the existing recession. Industrial sellers were no doubt cutting
back on inventori and simultaneously using more care in channel
selection and operation.
Consumer-goods sellers ranked assistance and development of
channels and warehousing and inventory, respectively, as most important a~d second most important in 196 ; in 1975 they ranked
warehousmg and inventory as most important, with the "other"
Category econd, and assistance and development in fifth place,
~nsu_mer-goods produc rs in fact cut back on every as pect of distribution except the "other" category plus warehousing a nd inven11

-tory. Consumer firms have less opportunity t han indust rial firms to
reduce inventories because they need to display goods for
customers and because they carry relatively more ty pes of goods
than do industrial firms. That clearly indicated that business conditions existing in 1975 had caused American producers to reevaluate distribution policy.

Table 4
Relative Importance of the
Facets of Distribution

Producers of
Facet

I

•,1

.... '

': I

r:i:

I

·11:i"1'

ll'.'S

1. Transporta -

16.6

23.8

18.2

19.5

17.0

2. Warehousing and
inventory

24.6

28.3

23.5

23.2

23.9

3 . Determina tion of chan nels

17.5

10.5

-11.0

14.2

14.7

4. Selection
and installa lion of channels

16.0

13.3

14.2

18.2

15.0

5. Assistance
to and development
of channels

17 .1

19.1

12.9

24.2

15.2

8.2

5.1

20.2

1.7

14.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

lion

•I

,1'

l~-,:1

~n~·
e··
,,1,·

Industrial Goods
Consumer Goods
1975
1975 Cdell's 1968 1975 dell's 1968 Average
Stud y
Study
Study•
Study
Percent
Percent Percent Percent Percent

6. Other
TOTAL

•Average of consumer durables and nond urables.
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Sales Effort Compared B Years
The six facets of sales efforts (compared in Table 5) demonstrate ,
as hypothesized , a clear pattern of adjustment from relative stabil ity and plenty in 1968, to rece sion, in nation, and shortage in 1975.
The adjustment was appa rent for both indu trial -good and consumer-goods prod ucers. Industrial producers ranked sales manageTable 5
Relative Importance of the Facets
of Sale Effort

Producer of
Facet

lndu trial Goods
Coo umer Goods
1975
1975 UdeU's 1968 1975
deU's 196 Average
tud,,
tudy
tudy
tudy
Percent
Percent Perce~t Percent Percent

(

(

1. Sales man agement
personal
elling

50.9

69.2

33.4

42.9

42.4

2. Broadcast
media

5.9

.9

23.6

15.8

16.6

10.8

12.5

11.1

15.5

10.3

t Special pro-

9.2

9.6

14.1

15.5

10.6

5. Branding
and promo tio_nal pack
agmg

9.7

4.5

9.6

9.7

9.2

13.4

3,3

8.2

.8

10.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

3. Printed
media
motional
activitie

6. Other

TOTAL

' Average of consumer durable and nondurable .
I

f
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ment and personal selling firs~ in import_ance in both 1968 and 1975;
but whereas they ranked prmted media second, in 1968, in 1975
th~y ranked the "other" categor!' second, indicating they difinitely
s~~ed from costly pe~s~n.al selhng to mass-media as business cond1t1ons worsened. Act1v1t1es other than personal selling increased
9.1 percent between 1968 and 1975; branding and broad media especially increased in importance in 1975 when the economy was at a
low ebb.
Consumer-product manufacturers also rated sales management
and personal sel1ing as most important to sales effort in both 1968
and 1975. In 1968. broadcast media, printed media, and special promotional artivities were virtually tied for second place; but in 1975
broadcast media easily emerged as the second most important
type.
Interestingly. there was not the degree of change to mass media
among ronsumer-product firms that was found for industrial firms.
Combined sales effort allocated to mass media totaled 56.5 percent
in 1968 and 58.4 percent in 1975. Thus. consumer-product producers allocated more total sales effort to mass media than to personal
selling, with considerable shift to the use of broadcast media. Consumer firms were already heavily allocating sales effort to mass
media in economically good years; hence, they had less opportunity
to adjust promotional cost in poor years. which might partly
explain why middlemen's prices are sometimes slow to adjust when
there is a downturn in economic activity. The relative shift in importance among the mass media may demonstrate an attempt by
consumer-goods producers to use the most economical form of mass
media _ Direct mail and special promotions. for example, can be
quite costly per number of respondents reached.

Pricing in 1975 Strategy
Table 6 allocates the three facets of pricing for 1975 by type of
producer. (Udell did not analyze those facets of pricing in his
article because his primary focus was on nonprice compeut1ve
strategy.) The figures indicate that, relatively speaking, consumergoods producers in 1975 were more price-policy consciou~ t~an
were industrial-product producers, who rated price determmat1?n
as more important. It is probably true that sellers in the industrial
market, which has a short channel that permits greater control
over total effort than is possible in the longer consumer channel,
must spend more of their time on price determination than do
sellers of consumer goods. Consumer-goods channel is of~en longer
and members do much of their own pricing. and logically mdepend·
ence among members in the consumer-goods channel makes the

14

Table 6
Relative Importance of the Facets of Pricing

Producers of

Facet

Industrial Goods
Consumer Goods
1975
1975
dell's 1968 1975
dell's 1968 Average
Studv
Study
Study
Study
Percent
Perce~t Percent Percent Percent

1. Price

31.4

NA "

37.3

NA

33.7

2. Pricing
strategies

36.5

NA

33.6

NA

35.4

3. Price determination

32.1

NA

29.1

NA

30.9

100.0

NA

100.0

policies

TOTAL

100.0

NA

' NA denotes data unavailable .

producer policy-conscious in an effort to persuade the channel
membership of the firm 's objectives .

SU~MARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Udell's 1968 study of the perceived importance of the elements of
competitive strategy toward marketing successful products was
replicated in 1975 to test its validity for a different time and
changed circumstances . It was especially important to check results for 1968, a time of relative stability and plenty, against those
for 1975, a period of recession and inflation (with shortages). Several important conclusions include:
L All major elements of competitive strategy are important in
marketing successful products. This finding, true for 1975 as
well as for 1968, supported Udell's position.
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2. In 1975 product e~fort had r:placed sales effort as t he strategy
component P:rce1ved most important. This find ing upported
the hypothes1~ that eler_nent vary with time, and t herefore,
?PPO ed Udell s conclus_1on that developing markets are more
important than developing products .

3. The ?ata sh_ow that the f_ace_ts ~f competitive strategy vary acc?rdmg to industry. This fmdmg agreed with Udell' conclusion.
4. The nonprice element of strategy were more important t han
pricing in both 1968 and 1975 .
5. The data did not point to clear conclusions on allocating marketing strategy by buyer motives. Udell had concluded a relationship existed, but the 1975 data did not support his findings .
Three other findings are worth mentioning. First, by 1975 both
industrial -goods producers and con umer -good producers were allocating approximately 56 percent of all competitive effort to product-related activities . In 1968 more than 40 percent of total effort
had been allo<'ated to sales. indicating that sales effort is more important to strategy in times of buyer optimism and product strategy more important in times of buyer pessimism.
econd, the facet of each strategy element perceived most important to succes ful products varied little over time.
Technical R & D was the most important facet of product strategy in both years for each type producer. Warehousing and inventory was most important to distribution for industrial -goods producers in both years. Consumer-goods producers, however, perceived assistance and development of channel most important in
1968. but warehousing and inventory most important in 1975.
Thus, in 1975 producer types agreed. Each year each type of producer considered sales management and personal selling as ~ost
important to sales effort. In 1975 pricing trategies were perceived
as most important to pricing effort by industrial -goods producer
but price policies were more important to consumer-goods producer . No comparison was made for pricing over time.
Third, product facets allocated by year and by type of producer
were much more similar than wer e the facets of t he other element
of competitive strategy. Appare ntly. ov er t he business cycle, managem nt has less opportu nity to vary produ ct policy t han other el·
ements of str ategy.
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One might question the assumption that distribution is primarily sales effort, especia!Jy in light of the physical aspects of distribution.
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